Corporate Political Free Speech: 2 U.S.C. 441b and the Superior Rights of Natural Persons by Baldwin, Fletcher N., Jr. & Karpay, Kenneth D.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 2 Article 6
1-1-1983
Corporate Political Free Speech: 2 U.S.C. 441b and
the Superior Rights of Natural Persons
Fletcher N. Baldwin Jr.
University of Florida
Kenneth D. Karpay
University of Florida
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fletcher N. Baldwin Jr. & Kenneth D. Karpay, Corporate Political Free Speech: 2 U.S.C. 441b and the Superior Rights of Natural Persons,
14 Pac. L. J. 209 (1983).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/6
Corporate Political Free Speech: 2
U.S.C. §441b and the Superior Rights
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For decades, public attention has focused on the need to protect
against corporate domination of American political structures.' In
1907, the United States Congress first passed legislation prohibiting
corporations from making contributions to candidates for federal polit-
ical office.2 During the following seventy-five years, this statute, in its
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1. See Hearings on Contributions to Political Committees in Presidential and Other Campaigns
Before the House Committee on the Election of the President, 59th Congress, Ist Sess. 56 (1906),
reprinted in United States v. U.A.W., 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957). This document provides the state-
ment of Alton B. Parker, 1904 Democratic candidate for the Presidency. Parker told the Commit-
tee, "[t]he greatest moral question which now confronts us is, shall trusts and corporations be
prevented from contributing money to control or aid in controlling elections." See also I LETTERS
TO Louis D. BRANDEIS 2040-05, 268-69, 300 (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1971) (measuring public
opinion on proposed legislation that would prohibit corporate contributions); Keysen, The Corpo-
ration: How Much Power? What Scope? in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIETY 85 (S. Mason
ed. 1960) (there is a significant link between corporate economic power and its impact on the
political system); 81 THE OUTLOOK 797-95 (1905) (the need for government controls of corporate
political activity is demonstrated by recent disclosures of corporate corruption); N.Y. Times, Jan.
29, 1981, at Al, col. 1 (statement of retiring Admiral Hyman G. Rickover to the Congressional
Joint Economic Committee, on the need to check the increasing power of corporations in Ameri-
can society).
2. Act of January 26, 1970, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version of 2 U.S.C. §441b
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Since 1907 the Congress has extended the statute to prohibit expendi-
tures and contributions by national banks and corporations in any election and by labor unions in
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amended form, has withstood most court challenges,' including the
claim that the statute violates corporations' first amendment free
speech rights.' Yet throughout this period the United States Supreme
Court has failed to address the major constitutional issue underlying
the statute: whether corporate political speech is entitled to the protec-
tion of the free speech clause of the first amendment- equivalent to that
of natural persons.6 Recent Court decisions7 have raised questions8
concerning the constitutionality of the current statute.9
any federal election. See infra notes 14 & 17. The statute affects both tax exempt and non-exempt
corporations, infra note 12.
3. See United States v. Chestnut, 533 F.2d 40, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 829 (1976)
(18 U.S.C. §610 (currently codified at 2 U.S.C. §441b (1976)) is neither overbroad nor void for
vagueness); Federal Election Comm'n v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (2
U.S.C. §441b encourages rather than discourages free speech and is constitutional). For a further
discussion of the court's decision in Weinsten, see infra text accompanying notes 170-176. But see,
e.g., Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 249, 258 (1921) (federal law prohibiting contribu-
tions or expenditures for U.S. Congressional seats violates U.S. CONsT. art. I, §4, cl. 1). The
Newberry decision was construed to have invalidated all federal corporate campaign prohibitions.
Subsequently, Congress passed the "Corrupt Practices Act of 1925." Act of February 28, 1925, ch.
368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
4. the first amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; of abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added to
free speech clause).
5. Id.
6. The few opinions in which the Supreme Court has even considered examining the consti-
tutionality of 2 U.S.C. §441b were in cases concerning labor unions. See Pipefitters Local Union
No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (reversal of erroneous jury instructions precludes
consideration of the constitutional issue); United States v. U.A.W., 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (disposi-
tion of the constitutionality of the statute is not absolutely necessary and therefore inappropriate);
United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106 (1948) (indictment of labor organization does not state an
offense under the statute, so the Court need not consider the constitutional issue).
7. See generally Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (New York State's ban on public utility company advertising violates
the first and fourteenth amendments); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Serv-
ice Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (New York's prohibition of electric company
inserting material in customer's monthly utility statement directly infringes first and fourteenth
amendment rights); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (Massachusetts
statute prohibiting corporations from making campaign contributions or expenditures in state
elections infringes on constitutionally protected speech). See infra text accompanying notes 83-99.
8. See Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the Federal Restrictions on Corporate and Union
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 945, 965-975 (1980); Patton &
Bartlett, Corporate 'Persons" and Freedom of Speech The Political Impact o L egal Mythology,
1981 Wis. L. Ray. 494, 495-502, 509-13 [hereinafter referred to as Patton]; Rather, Corporations
and the Constitution, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 11, 27-29 (1981).
9. 2 U.S.C. §441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provides in part:
Contributions or expenditures by national banks, corporations, or labor organizations
(a) It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of
any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any elec-
tion to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political con-
vention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any corporation
whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connec-
tion with any election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or
Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted
for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to
select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political commit-
tee, or other person knowingly to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this
section, or any officer or any director of any corporation or any national bank or any
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This article will examine the legislative rationale underlying 2
U.S.C., section 441b, as well as the framework established by the
Supreme Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti ° for analyz-
ing the first amendment free speech rights of corporations. The result-
ing conflict between corporate and natural persons' free speech rights,
will be studied in relation to policies operating within the conflict. In
addition, the Supreme Court's application of other constitutional rights
to corporations and the approach used by lower courts in determining
corporate free speech rights will be considered. Further, the constitu-
tional rights of natural persons will be weighed against those of corpo-
rations to show that the superiority of the former requires a
reaffirmation of the constitutional validity of section 441b.
FEDERAL STATUTORY REGULATION 2 U.S.C., SECTION 441B
Federal statute 2 U.S.C., section 441b' forbids corporations
12
chartered by Congress 3 from making political contributions or ex-
penditures 14 in an election, convention or caucus. State chartered cor-
officer of any labor organization to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the
corporation, national bank, or labor organization, as the case may be, prohibited by this
section.
Id; see also infra notes 14 & 208.
10. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
11. See supra note 9.
12. The provisions of 2 U.S.C. §441b refer to all forms of federally and state chartered corpo-
rations, both tax exempt and non-exempt entities. See I.R.C. §501(c)(3) (Supp V 1981). Seegen-
erall HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 154-57 (1977) (describes the scope
and applicability of the Internal Revenue Code's provisions). Presumably, if §441b were held
unconstitutional and corporations were permitted to make contributions or expenditures in polit-
ical campaigns, exempt corporations would still refrain from these activities in order to maintain
their tax exempt status. d.
13. Congress has no explicit power to charter corporations. Rather its power in this area
stems from the "necessary and proper" clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art.
I, §8, cl. 18. Congress has chartered corporations for the purpose of promoting transportation and
other national concerns. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529 (1894) (Con-
gressionally chartered corporation represents a valid exercise of the Congressional power). This
implied power is also the source of nationally chartered banking corporations. See 12 U.S.C. §24
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see also Tarrant v. Bessemer National Bank, 7 Ala. App. 285, 61 So. 47
(1912) (national banks are an appropriate exercise of Congress's power). Congress has also used
this power to incorporate numerous patriotic and civic organizations. See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. §2
(1976) (national corporation, The American National Red Cross, has full corporate privileges and
powers); American Nat'l Red Cross v. Felzner Post, 86 Ind. App. 709, 159 N.E. 771 (1928) (Na-
tional corporation has powers to defend claims in court).
14. 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2) defines "contribution or expenditure" to include
any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit or gift of money, or
any services, or anything of value (except a loan of money by a national bank or State
bank made in accordance with the applicable banking laws and regulations and in the
ordinary course of business) to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or
organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in this
sectio . .
2 U.S.C. §441(b)(2). As originally enacted in 1907 the statute only prohibited corporations from
making "a money contribution." See Act of January 26, 1907, ch. 420,34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current
version at 2 U.S.C. §441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 2. In 1908, Congress defeated a
measure which would have altered the prohibition to include "any contribution of money or other
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porations'5 fall within the purview of the statute' 6 in connection with
campaigns for federal office. 17  Additionally, several states' 8 and mu-
nicipalities 9 have extended similar restrictions to campaigns for state
things of value." 42 CONG. REC. 696-98 (1908). Thus a large loophole existed in the law until
1925 when the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was passed. Ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925).
Section 302 of the Act expanded the "contribution" prohibition to include "a gift, subscription,
loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise or
agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution." Id., tit. III, §302(d). See
generally Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech,
22 ARIZ. L. REv. 373, 376-81 (1980) (discussion of Congressional debate on these provisions).
15. Most business corporations are chartered under state, rather than federal law. See H.
HENN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS 25 (1970). However, proposals have been offered for enacting a
mandatory federal incorporation statute. For background on this proposal see R. NADER, M.
GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, FEDERAL CHARTERING OF CORPORATIONS (1976) [hereinafter referred to
as NADER]; see also Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972); Rubin,
Corporations and Society: The Remedy of Federal and International Incorporation, 23 AM. U. L.
REv. 263 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Federal Election Commission v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (New York corporation guilty of violating 2 U.S.C. §441b).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Chestnut, 394 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), a'd 533 F.2d 40
(2d Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 829 (1976) (violation of statute by accepting state chartered corpo-
rate campaign contribution to a United Staes Senate campaign). The statute also prohibits na-
tional banks from participating in any federal or state election, convention or caucus; unions are
prohibited from such federal political activities. 2 U.S.C. §441b(a) (1976). Although much of the
litigation in this area deals with national banks and labor unions, the focus of this article will be
primarily on corporations. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
414 U.S. 1076 (1973) (former union president found in violation of 18 U.S.C. §610 (current ver-
sion 2 U.S.C. §441b (1976)).
18. Approximately thirty states have statutes that in some way regulate corporate campaign
spending. See Brief for Appellee at 32-33 n.19, First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§18-1482, 18-1488 (West. 1979 & Supp. 1982). Some pro-
vide strict corporate restrictions. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §210A.34 (1980). Others regulate
natural persons and corporate political activities in a similar fashion but provide for more strin-
gent penalties for campaign practice violations by corporations. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§106.08(1),
775.082, 775.083 (1981). At least one general election statute has been judicially narrowed to
avoid constitutional infirmities. N.Y. Election Law §14-116 (Consol. 1977). See Schwartz v.
Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974) (referendum's contribution prohibitions construed nar-
rowly). Other statutes that impact more stringently on corporations have been held unconstitu-
tional See, e.g., MONTANA CODE ANN. §23-4744 (1977); C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 420 F.
Supp. 1254 (D. Mont.), afd, 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978). However generally, state statutes simi-
lar to §441b remain in effect in full force in a majority of the states. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§56.29 (West 1981). See generally Fox, Corporate Political Speech: The Effect of First National
Bank of Boston . Bellotti Upon Statutory Limitations on Corporate Re/erendum Spending in THE
CORPORATION IN POLITICS 1980 309, 320-21 (1980) (provides background and additional state
statutory information).
It is interesting to note that state legislatures were the original stimulus to the enactment of the
federal regulatory scheme to prohibit corporate campaign contributions. By 1907, the date of the
enactment of the original federal act, eight states had already passed some type of statute regulat-
ing corporate contributions in state elections. By 1915 this number had increased to twenty-nine,
and by 1925, the date of the federal act with some real impact, thirty-seven states had already
acted. See E. SIKES, CORRUPT PRACTICES LEGISLATION 279-83, table five, column 1 (1928).
However the focus and strength of these state provisions varied. Compare KAN. GEN. STAT.
§4350-ch. 33-Art. 15 (1915) (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. §25-1709 (1981)) (prohibits con-
tribution by corporations that have the power of eminent domain, or by persons in control of a
majority of stock of a corporation) with Mo. REv. STAT. §§5022-5027-ch. 30-Art. 13 (1919) (re-
pealed 1977 and replaced by Mo. ANN. STAT. §130.029 (Vernon 1980)) (prohibitions apply to any
corporation; violation of statute could result in forfeiture of corporate charter). See generally
BROOKS, CORRUtroN IN AMERICAN POLrrICS AND LIFE 244-48 (1910) (concerning corruption on
different governmental levels).
19. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CA., ELECTION REFORM ACT, ORDINANCE No. 4700-N.S. (1974).
The Berkeley ordinance placed a $250 contribution limitation on donations made to political coin-
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and local offices.
The federal statute has undergone numerous changes since its enact-
ment in 1907,20 but the supporting legislative rationales remain con-
stant.2 ' First, Congress intends the statute to negate the direct
influence of large accumulations of power in the electoral process.22
Following the Civil War the American economy expanded, but also
became increasingly centralized.' As a result, many corporations with
mittees. The ordinance was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434 (1982). The Court found the statute
violated the first amendment because it imposed limitations on committees but not on individuals.
Id. at 437-39.
20. For a discussion concerning some of the changes through 1925 see supra notes 3 & 14.
Subsequent amendments to the entire statute made significant changes in the overall election
scheme, but still left the prohibition concerning corporate political activity intact. See Smith-
Connally Act, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 168 (1943) (extended campaign prohibitions to labor unions); Taft-
Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 159 (1947) (reinforced union campaign prohibitions); Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (allowed both union and corpo-
rate funds to be used to set up political action committees (PACs)); Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-433, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (imposed significant restric-
tions and prohibitions on natural citizens); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976) (clarified questions concerning corporate and union activi-
ties concerning political action committees).
21. Compare 120 CONG. REC. 8209-11 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy discussing S.3044
and the necessity of removing corporate influence from American politics) with 42 CONG. REC.
696-702 (1908) (floor debate on amendment to 1907 bill). See generally Comment, From
Dartmouth College to Bellotti: The Political Career of the American Business Corporation, 6 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 392, 396-98 (1979) (Congressional actions from 1907 through 1976 demonstrate
consistent goal.)
22. Congressional debates on federal election laws provide numerous examples of this legis-
lative intent. See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 9507-08 (1925) (statement by Sen. Robinson in support of
1925 Corrupt Practices Act); see also 120 CONG. RECORD 9552-55 (1974) (the Senate rejected
Senator Baker's amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment (FECA of
1974)). Baker's amendment to Senate Bill 3044 would have eliminated a provision allowing indi-
rect but legitimate corporate and labor political contributions through the formation of "political
action committees" (PACs). During floor debate on the amendment, concern was expressed on
the need to eliminate political influence by all except natural individuals. 120 CONG. REC. 9552-
53 (1974). The amendment was rejected. Corporations and unions still have indirect but tremen-
dous access to the political system through use of political action committees. 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). By forming a PAC, a corporation can solicit voluntary contributions
from employees and shareholders and then control where the money goes by directing operations
of the committee. Although corporate assets are not directly contributed to political campaigns,
PACs do dilute the impact of 4lb by allowing indirect corporate input. See infra note 208. The
continued existence of this PAC provision in 2 U.S.C. §441b indicates Congress does not wish to
totally eliminate corporate political influence. See Bolton, supra note 14, at 411-13; Note, Political
Speech, Inc. The Bellotti Decision and Corporate Political Spending, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. Rav. 10-23,
1049 (1979). The Courts have consistently interpreted §441b as manifesting Congress's intent to
keep corporate influence out of elections. See, e.g., United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 113-14
(1948).
23. For background on this general economic development, see S. BRUCHEY, GROWTH OF
THE MODERN AMERICAN ECONOMY (1975); D.H. Donald, Uniting the Republic: 1860-1890, in
THE GREAT REPUBLIC 777-87 (1977); J.L. Thomas, Nationalizing the Republic: 1890-1920 in id. at
830-48; S. MoRIsoN, H. COMARAGER, & W. LEUCHTENBURG, 2 GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 355 (4th ed. 1950); Nader, supra note 15, at 38-49. A major factor contributing to this
development was the tremendous growth of the railroads throughout the continent, following the
Civil War. This promoted centralization of the means of production, while affording entrepre-
neurs access to distant markets. See S. MORISON, THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE, 743-50, 761-64, 789-95, 811-23 (1965); Nader, supra note 15, at 38-39. For specific exam-
ples of this economic growth see A. BURNS, PRODUCTION TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE
1870, 253-81 (1934) (describes the tremendous transformation of the American economy following
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tremendous wealth at their disposal were able to exercise a significant
control over the legislative process by the simultaneous use of financial
support and quidpro quos.24 Disclosure of these corrupt practices fol-
lowing the turn of the century stimulated public concern for the health
of the American electoral system.25 The Congressional goal has been
to eradicate both perceived and actual corruption in government. Sec-
ond, the original statute and its successors reflect a belief that use of
corporate funds for political purposes by corporate executives is im-
moral.26 In most cases, corporate funds would be expended without
the actual permission of stockholders.27 Since "corporate views" are
determined by corporate executives, these campaign contributions ac-
tually would subsidize the promotion of the political beliefs of these
the Civil War); G. EVANS, BUSINESS INCORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1800-1943,3, 31-41
(1948) (details the use of incorporated organizations following the Civil War); S. FABRICANT, THE
OUTPUT OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1899-1937, 3-22 (1940) (details growth by industry); J.
GOULD, OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES 1899-1942, 6-30
(1946) (study of these industries' growth).
24. For evidence of this phenomenon see E. SIKES, CORRUPT PRACTICES LEGISLATION 104-
13 (1928). In 1905 the New York State Legislature investigated the campaign practices of large
life insurance corporations. Their investigation details the frequency with which large corpora-
tions sustained political influence through campaign contributions. G. THAYER, WHO SHAKES
THE MONEY TREE 53 (1973). Testifying before the New York State Legislature Investigating
Committee, United States Senator T.C. Platt admitted that campaign contributions put political
office-holders under a virtual obligation not to attack their supporters. Id.-For evidence of this
practice more recently, see THE FINAL REPORT ON THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIvITIES, S. REP. No. 981, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 445-
92 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. See infra notes 160-162.
25. See supra note 24. America's increasing sensitivity to corporate political influence during
this period was due in part to journalists and writers like Lincoln Steffens, Ida Tarbell and Alfred
Henry Lewis. See C. REGIER, THE ERA OF THE MUCKRACKERS (1957); R. Barker, Ray Stannard
Baker Holds on to His Muckrake in THE PROGRESSIVE 157-80 (C. Resek ed. 1967); see also 3 THtE
LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 635-36 (E. Morison ed. 195 1) (letter of Roosevelt arguing for
corporate political prohibitions, based on recent disclosures). For examples of other disclosures,
see R. BROOKS, CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND LIFE 273-76 (1910); GEORGE WASH-
INGTON PLUNKrTr, VERY PLAIN TALKS ON VERY PRACTICAL POLITICS (1905), reprinted in W.
RIORDON, PLUNKirT OF TAMMANY HALL 73-76 (1963). See generally Thomas, supra note 23, at
903-06 (Progressive Era and political disclosures).
26. See Hearings Before the House Committee on the Election ofthe President, 59th Cong., 1st
Sess. 76 (1906) noted iT, United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 113 n.9 (1948) (corporate officials
had no moral right to use corporate funds without stockholders' approval); see also 81 THE OUT-
LOOK 248-49 (1905) (corporate political practices require moral reform).
27. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 24. Report demonstrates that illegal corporate contribu-
tions to Richard Nixon's re-election campaign were made in secret and without shareholders'
approval. The Court has recognized the value of having any corporate or union political activity
be specifically endorsed by shareholders or union members. See Pipefitters LocalUnion No. 562
v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-15 (1972) (goal of Congress was to guarantee that corporate
and union political action committees solicit funds solely on voluntary basis); see also Id. at 442-
50 (Powell, J., dissenting) (Court's opinion provides insufficient protection); cf. First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978) (Powell, J., majority opinion). In Bellotti the Court
found the goal of protecting corporate shareholders was not sufficient to uphold the Massachusetts
statute due to both the under- and overinclusiveness of the provision. Id. However the Court
avoided the opportunity to assert that protection of shareholder's interest was a compelling gov-
ernment interest. Id. at 795. Justice Powell in Bellolli seems to have ignored his own statements
made in P#pe tters when he urged a different course by the Court in order to protect shareholder
and union members. 407 U.S. at 441-50.
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men and women.28 Thus, section 441b aims to severely limit corporate
access to the political arena.
These two legislative rationales, however, reflect a broader and more
subtle policy concern tied directly to the strength of the federal govern-
ment itself. Support for section 441b stems from the idea that when
government is perceived as unresponsive to the needs of individuals,
public support for government is diminished.29 By the turn of the cen-
tury, the public's perception of inordinate corporate influence in Amer-
ican politics30 began to erode the traditional belief in individual
efficacy within the political system." Enactment of the statute reflects a
desire to sustain individual citizens' interest, involvement and support
for their national government.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: AN INITIAL INQUIRY
The most potent challenges to section 441b and similar statutes have
been based on the idea that the statutes abridge corporations' first
amendment rights of freedom of speech.32 Numerous theories are said
28. See Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U.S. 498, (1959). In Cammarano, the Court refused to
allow petitioners an income tax deduction for expenditures claimed as an "ordinary and neces-
sary" business expense. Petitioners had made a contribution to a partnership trust which in turn
expended money in attempting to defeat a statewise referendum. If passed, the referendum would
have been detrimental to petitioners' partnership. The Court denied petitioner's tax deduction
pursuant to Treasury Regulation §29.23(o)-i (current version at I.R.C. §162(e)(2)(B) (Supp. V
1981)) noting the deduction was used to defeat a legislative proposal and thus non-deductible. 358
U.S. at 499-500 & n.2. The Court observed that denying petitioners' claim simply forced these
taxpayers to be treated like other taxpayers, and thus pay the full amount for their political expres-
sion without government subsidization. Id. at 512-13.
29. United States v. C.I.O., 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957). Interpreting the goal of the statute the
Court stated that
its aim was not merely to prevent the subversion of the integrity of the political process.
Its underlying philosophy was to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the individual
citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government.
Id. See generally Brief of Appellees at 7, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S.
CL 434 (1982). Appellees provide evidence of decreased political activism by individual natural
citizens in California, as corporations become increasingly involved in state political campaigns.
The Court in Citizens did not find such evidence relevant to the case at hand. See 102 S. Ct. at
437-38. But see id. at 441-45 (White, J., dissenting).
30. See E. ROOT, The Political Use qfMoney, in ADDRESSES OF GOVERNMENT AND CITIZEN-
SHIP 141 (1943) (classic speech calling for control of the influence of large corporations); see also
supra notes 24-25.
31. Congress's passage of legislation limiting corporate political influence usually is premised
on this concern. See supra notes 21-22. The Court has consistently noted this was an interest of
"the highest importance." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978). See
generally H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLrrIcs (1972) (impact on citizens of large campaign ex-
penditures in political campaigns).
32. Although most challenges have not succeeded, the first amendment argument has often
been very persuasive. See Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, (5th Cir. 1980), a 'd sub
nom. Firestone v. Let's Help Florida, 50 U.S.L.W. 3546 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 80-970) (Florida
statute restricting referendum contributions violated individual's first amendment rights); Federal
Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Committee, 501 F. Supp. 422,436-38 (D.D.C. 1980),
rev'don other grounds 665 F.2d 371 (1981) (§441b's restrictions on union campaign solitications
met the compelling interest test); United States v. Chestnut, 394 F. Supp. 581, 5&7-91 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), a fd 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976) (state's interests serve to
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to underlie this constitutional protection for natural persons.3 3 A brief
overview of two of these theories and their application by the Supreme
Court provides a basis for examining the constitutional question posed
by the statute.
The purpose of the first amendment freedom of speech clause, ac-
cording to the late Professor Meiklejobn,34 is the protection of both the
speaker's right of free speech and the public's right to listen.35 Political
expression receives constitutional protection in order to maximize
political participation and the consideration of diverse views within the
political marketplace.3 6  At the core of the Meiklejohn theory is the
belief that a diversity of political expression results in high levels of
political participation.37  In contrast another theory supports first
amendment protection for natural persons by arguing that the principal
function of the free speech clause is promoting individual "self-expres-
sion, self-realization and self-fulfillment. ' 38 Freedom of speech is pro-
uphold §441b as applied to campaign manager soliciting illegal contributions); Louchheim, Eng &
People Inc. v. Carson, 241 S.E.2d 401, 404-06 (N.C. App. 1978) (North Carolina statute similar to
2 U.S.C. §441b is constitutional).
33. For a discussion of two of these theories as described by Professors Meiklejobn and
Emerson, see su~pra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. Two other theories have developed in the
case law. One is the "clear and present danger" test. Speech may be immune to proposed restric-
tions, according to this view, so lon& as a compelling governmental interest does not require its
suppression. For an overview of this test see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918)
(inquiry centers on whether words create such a danger); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
627-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 376-79 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,450-57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); see also Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 575 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See generally Frantz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE L.J 1424 (1962). Another view of first amendment rights is the absolutist's
view, espoused primarily by Justices Black and Douglas. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Califor-
nia, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United Staes, 360 U.S. 109, 140
(1958), (Black, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 511-12 (1956) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). This standard finds prohibitions against speech absolutely unacceptable. Thus, courts
and legislative bodies are to be precluded from weighing the values of speech against silence. 354
U.S. at 514. See generally T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIoHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 43-45 (1976).
34. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1965); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948) [hereinafter referred to as FREE SPEECH];
Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean? 20 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 461 (1953).
35. FREE SPEECH, supra note 34, at 25-26. The purpose of the free speech clause is not to
provide for "unregulated talkativeness. It does not require that on every occasion, every citizen
take part in public debate.... What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that every-
thing worth saying shall be said." Id. at 25. For an extremely thorough discussion on the history
behind the "right to listen," see Comment, Freedom to Hear: A Political Justbication of the First
Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311 (1971).
36. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1975) (commercial speech protected because of the goal of maximizing the public's ex-
plosure to information); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) ("[t]hat the air may at
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is. . .not a sign of weakness, but of strength"); Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 8, 101-06 (1939) (loitering statute invalid).
37. See generally Meiklejohn, supra note 34, at 92-107.
38. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05 (1978) (White, J., dissent-
ing). See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7
(1970); EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) [hereinafter referred to as
Tim SYSTEM].
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moted in order to encourage the development of individuals in society
and the general well-being of the nation. 9
Two levels of first amendment analysis have developed as a result of
these theories. First, the Supreme Court generally restricts governmen-
tal intrusions on the exercise of political expression by natural per-
sons.4' These abridgements are examined with strict scrutiny, and are
only upheld when governmental interests are sufficiently compelling to
deprive a citizen of her right to political self-expression.41 This is no
less true when the restrictions infringe on natural citizens' participation
in the electoral process, a form of political speech, either by restricting
actual political speech 42 or political speech conveyed through contribu-
tions and expenditures of money.43 Restriction of political expression
has been upheld when the prevention of corruption and its appearance
were the governmental interests.44 Alternatively, these abridgements
have been invalidated when based upon the government's desire to
equalize participation by natural persons in the electoral process45 and
to decelerate increasing campaign costs. 46
Second, the Court developed a subordinate level of first amendment
protection for commercial communications.47 Unlike the right ac-
corded natural persons, commercial speech does not receive protection
because of an independent right of free speech.48 Instead protection
results from the right of listeners to receive an abundance of commer-
cial communications within the marketplace of ideas.49 So long as
commercial speech contains sufficient valuable information to listen-
39. See THE SYSTEM, supra note 38, at 43-53.
40. See Stanely v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 507-514 (1968); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-
43 (1965).
41. See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-113 (1968) (government restrictions invalid);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-377 (1967) (government interests are compelling and
the restrictions are no greater than are essential); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 271-74
(1956) (evidence does not support rejecting petitioner's Bar Application).
42. See, e.g., United States Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551, 553-
56 (1972) (Congress can restrict federal employees' political activities).
43. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (decision upholding and invalidating portions of
federal election scheme); United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 414
U.S. 1076 (violation of campaign law by union president upheld).
44. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-30 (1976). But see Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512
F. Supp. 489, 498-500 (D.C. Cir. 1980) a9'dby an equaly divided Court 50 U.S.L.W. 4168 (1982).
45. 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
46. 424 U.S. at 57.
47. See Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 CAL. W.L. REv. 430
(1977).
48. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57
(1975); see Baker, Commercial Speeck" .4 Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1
(1976).
49. Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-65. In Virginia, the Court found that
consumers had a true interest in receiving information concerning the price of prescription drugs.
Id. at 763-65. The Court's opinion here claims that the theoretical basis of its decision is
Meiklejohn's marketplace of ideas. Id. at 765 n.19. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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ers,50 it flows freely, with minimal restriction.5  When, however, com-
mercial speech conflicts with the interests of the listeners, it must be
restrained.5 2  Thus, although the Court established a new and signifi-
cant level of protected speech, it is speech subordinate to the listener's
informational interests, and the level of first amendment protection af-
forded natural persons.
The result is differing levels of constitutional protection depending
upon the nature of the speech involved. 3 The Court has avoided
resolving similar schemes for corporate entities. 4 An examination of
decisions applying other constitutional protections to corporate entities,
however, provides insight as to how the Court may ultimately resolve
this issue.
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
In defining the parameters of corporate speech, it is useful to con-
sider the varying rationales underlying the Supreme Court's decisions
extending other constitutional rights to these entities. The Court's deci-
sions consistently demonstrate a desire to achieve the proper balance
between the conflicting economic and political implications of corpo-
rate constitutional protections.5 The decisions often reflect the goal of
maximizing the well-being of natural citizens.56 The same goal should
50. See 425 U.S. at 764-65 (drug prices are important information); Comment, First lAmend-
ment Protectionfor Commercial Speech: An Optical Illusion, 31 U. FLA. L. Rav. 799 (1979). But
see, Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1979) (optometrist's use of a trade contains no infor-
mation about price and may be misleading.
51. See 425 U.S. at 770-71. The Court in Virginia noted that time, place and manner restric-
tions on commercial speech would likely be upheld. The only conditions on such restrictions are
that they are "without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for com-
munication." Id. at 771; see Metpath, Inc. v. Myers, 462 F. Supp. 1104, 1108-11 (N.D. Calif. 1978)
(state interests in advertising ban on laboratory cannot withstand judicial scrutiny). But see
American Future Systems, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State University, 464 F. Supp. 1252, 1262-65
(N.D. Pa. 1979), aft'd 618 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980) (University's restrictions on campus dormitory
solitication upheld).
52. For example in Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1978), the Court upheld section
5.13(d) of the Texas Optometry Act. One provision of the Act prohibited the operation of an
optometric practice under a trade name. 440 U.S. at 5 n.6. The concern for protecting the public
from deceptive and misleading optometric practices provided the basis for upholding the statute.
Id. at 13-16. The Court found that the interests of the listening public were better promoted by
upholding the statute. Id. at 16.
53. Compare Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976) (state interest in protecting con-
sumers is sufficient to uphold statute regulating optometrists' form of advertising) and Ohralik v.
State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 462-68 (1978) (Bar may discipline lawyer for soliciting clients
under certain circumstances) with Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (state's interests are
not sufficiently compelling to require display on non-commercial vehicles of state motto "Live
Free or Die") and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1970) (state interest in making public
display of statement "Fuck the Draft" a criminal offense is not sufficiently compelling).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
55. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
56. See, ag., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1949) (corporation must
comply with government disclosure requests). Unlike natural persons, the United States Constitu-
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be pursued when the Court seeks resolution of the constitutional con-
flict between corporate and natural persons' first amendment free
speech rights.
Denying corporations the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination, 7 for example, balances these significant concerns. The
Court first withheld this privilege from a corporate litigant in Hale v.
Henkel.-8 Petitioner Hale, secretary and treasurer of a U.S. corpora-
tion,59 sought to invoke the fifth amendment privilege in a grand jury
investigation. By refusing to testify,60 he hoped to bar access to his
employer's business practices during grand jury investigation of possi-
ble Sherman Anti-trust violations 1.6  Denying corporations this privi-
lege facilitates successful corporate criminal prosecution, 62  which
detrimentally affects assets and shareholders' interests. 3
Despite this impact, the Hale Court was more concerned with the
other likely effect of granting the privilege.' Since successful antitrust
prosecutions usually require testimony of corporate agents,65 extension
of the privilege would seriously frustrate enforcement of the Sherman
Act.66 This decision thus found that the interests of the political and
legal system in protecting natural persons' rights were superior to the
economic interests of the corporation.67
tion has not been held to automatically apply to all natural persons who are found to be United
States citizens. See The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 83, 88-90 (1809) (corpo-
ration's right to sue depends on natural persons' rights). Thus the Court has over time both ex-
tended and denied certain constitutional protections to corporations. See supra notes 77-80 and
accompanying text.
57. This protection stems from the language that "No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. CONsT. amend V.
58. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
59. Hale was officer of the MacAndrews & Forbes Company.
60. 201 U.S. at 58. In Hale the Court considered two constitutional issues: first, whether
Hale could claim the fifth amendment privilege; second, whether he could bar the grand jury's
access to his employer's records, by claiming the fourth amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Court held that he could. Id. at 70-77.
61. Sherman Anti-trust Act, ch. 647, §1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§1-
7 (1976).
62. 201 U.S. at 70.
63. Successful prosecutions usually result in heavy fines, which are paid from corporate as-
sets. See generally E. MANSFIELD, MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 135-96
(1974).
64. 201 U.S. at 69-70. In addition, the Court noted that federal law did immunize Hale from
personal liability. Id. at 66-67, 69-70; see Act of February 25, 1930, ch. 755, 32 Stat. at L. 854, 904,
U.S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1905, p. 602, dtedin 201 U.S. at 66.
65. Id. at 70.
66. Id.
67. This would appear to be the major rationale for the Court's decision. The Court also
supported its position, denying corporate entities the fifth amendment privilege, by interpreting
the constitutional protection as a "purely personal privilege." Id. at 69. However, the Court's
former concern, the likely impact of such constitutional protections on anti-trust violations, seems
to have been a stronger rationale. In Hale, petitioner also sought corporate access to the fourth
amendment to preclude investigation of company records. See supra note 60. In that portion of
the opinion the Court noted such protection was necessary to protect the individual shareholder's
interests. "Corporations are a necessary feature of modem business activity, and their aggregated
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Since Hale, the Court has reaffirmed its concern with preventing cor-
porations from foiling enforcement of federal and state laws.6 8 Con-
sistently, the fifth amendment privilege has been only available to
natural persons.69
In other instances, however, the Court has found economic impacts
that have dictated extension of constitutional protections to corpora-
tions. Two lower court opinions, both written by Supreme Court Jus-
tice Field as a circuit judge in the 1880s, provide the rationale for
corporate protection under the equal protection clause.7" Both of these
decisions involve the validity of a California tax statute.71 The corpo-
rate litigant successfully argued that the statute unconstitutionally de-
nied them equal protection by providing natural persons, but not
railroads and corporations, a deduction for the amount of any mort-
gage attached to taxable property.72 Both decisions reflect a concern
that denying corporations equal protection would detrimentally affect
capital has become the source of nearly all great enterprises." 201 U.S. at 76. There is, hov ever,
no discussion by the Court stating why the fifth amendment privilege was "purely personal" and
the fourth amendment was not. Rather the tremendously negative impact on the public interest
that would likely result from extending corporations the fifth amendment privilege as compared to
the minimal impact by similarly extending the fourth amendment privilege, seems to be the major
source for the decision. See also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14
(discredits idea that extending corporation first amendment rights in the past was based on finding
whether an individual or association was involved).
68. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (inapplicability of fifth amendment to
corporate records); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (natural persons, not artificial enti-
ties or organizations, may claim fifth amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694
(1944) (individual in his representative capacity for a union cannot claim fifth amendment
privilege).
69. See O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited" Social and Political
Expression After First National Bank v. Bellot, 67 GEo. L.J. 1347, 1356-59 (1979). Examining
Henkel and other cases, O'Kelley argues that the Court extends corporationk's constitutional pro-
tections when individual shareholders would have enjoyed such rights if they had acted in a non-
corporate form. Id. at 1356, 1359. This is a valid conclusion. However this Article proposes an
alternative theory for both explaining the Court's decision in Hale and providing a stronger basis
for upholding §441b. See infra text accompanying notes 73-81, 223-25. See generall, Ratner,
supra note 8 (corporations entitled to fifth amendment protection).
70. County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402-04 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883),
aft'd 118 U.S. 394 (1886); County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 13 F. 722, 740-44
(C.C.D. Cal. 1882), dismissed 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
71. Section 3664 of the Political Code of California directed the State Board of Equalization
to make assessments of "the franchise, roadway, road-bed, rails, and rolling-stock of railroads
operated in more than one county." Assessments were to be made at "its actual value." See Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1885). In addition,
the 1879 California state constitution directed that
"[e]xcept as to railroad and other quasi-public corporations, in case of debts . . . the
value of the property affected by. . .[a]. . .mortgage, deed or trust, contract, or obliga-
tion, less the value of that security, shall be assessed and taxed to the owner of the prop-
erty, and the value of such security shall be assessed and taxed to the owner therof....
Id. at 404 (quoting fourth section of California Constitution of 1879).
72. Id. at 404, 409-410. Under the California constitution, railroads were not allowed a de-
duction for mortgages on their property. Consequently the State Board of Equalization made
assessments on railroad property, owned by corporations, differently than on property owned by
natural persons. See Id. at 404-10; County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. at 390;
County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. at 726.
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individual shareholders, as well as the growth of the American econ-
omy.73 The courts feared that a refusal to extend equal protection to
corporations would lessen the security of land possession in the corpo-
rate form and establish disincentives to further growth.74 These opin-
ions were briefly and conclusorily affirmed by the Supreme Court in
1886. 71 The Court's decision demonstrates a desire to accommodate
continued growth of the post-Civil War economy,76 and foremost, to
benefit natural persons who would reap the advantages of a strong
economy.
In other areas, the Supreme Court has both denied 77 and extended
7 8
constitutional protection to corporations. Although there is no consis-
tent rationale underlying a majority of these opinions, the cases do re-
flect a similar balancing between the interests of corporations and
natural persons.79 Consistently, the Court has established corporate
73. See County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. at 405; County of San Mateo v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. at 744.
74. See 18 F. at 435-37. It should be emphasized that the Court's concern for corporate
constitutional protections may have been particularly acute at this time since railroad corporations
were involved in these cases. This was an important time for railroad expansion, and it would be
reasonable to see the Court's opinion evidencing some spirit of protectionalism. For a discussion
on the importance of the growth of the railroads in the American economy, see MORISON, supra
note 23; NADER, supra note 15.
75. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). The Court's decision, considering whether the equal protection pro-
vision of the fourteenth amendment applied to corporations, simply stated, "We are all of opinion
that it does." Id. at 394.
76. The Court decision here reflects a balancing of first, the goal of corporations' and the
nation's economic growth, with second, the costs accruing to natural citizens in extending this
constitutional protection. See supra note 73. Unlike the Court's decision in Hale, the former was
more persuasive here. See supra text and accompanying notes 57-69. For another interpretation
of the Court's approach, see O'Kelley, supra note 68, at 1353-56 (constitutional protections ex-
tended because of coextensive shareholder rights). See generally Miller, On Politics, Democracy,
and the First 4mendment: 4 Commentary on First National Bank v. Bellotti, 38 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 21, 24-26, 28-31 (1981) (Court's approach in Santa Clara, and in other areas, stem from
Court's pro-corporate biases).
77. Some of the other constitutional protections that have not been extended to corporations
include: the privileges and immunities clause as applied by the fourteenth amendment, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, §2; see, e.g., Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1945); the
right of privacy, see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1949) (corporations have
no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to carry on commercial operations in
private); the due process protections of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, §1,
see, e.g., Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906). But see
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (statute depriving a newspaper of "property"
is invalid); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (corporation's property is too
important to allow deprivation). See generally Comment, Freedom of Speech andthe Corporation,
4 VILL. L. REV. 377, 378 & nn.4, 6 & 7 (1959).
78. Some of the other constitutional protections that have been extended to corporations in-
dude: the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, §1; see, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1924); see also supra note 79 for a
discussion on the Court's underlying rationale in this area. But see, e.g., Northwestern National
Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); freedom of the press, U.S. CONsT. amend. I,
cl. 2; see, eg., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); the right against unreasonable
search and seizures, U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See supra notes 60 & 67.
79. In some cases, the Court has denied and then later granted the same constitutional pro-
tection to different corporations. For example, in Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v.
Riggs, the Court upheld a Missouri statute against the corporate appellant's claim that the statute
denied the corporation due process of law. 203 U.S. 243, 243-50 (1906). The Court noted that
"liberty" in the fourteenth amendment referred to that "of natural not artificial persons." Id. at
221
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rights only where the interests of natural citizens would not be detri-
mentally affected. 0
Resolution of the constitutional issue implicit in section 441b would
require a similar balancing of interests between corporations and natu-
ral persons. This balance, however, must follow a judicial determina-
tion of the level of judicial scrutiny to be accorded corporate entities.Y
Though this question was clearly presented in First National Bank of
Boston v. Belloti,82 the Supreme Court failed to directly address that
issue.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON v BELLOyT"I
In Bellotti, 83 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
Massachusetts election statute.8 4 Section 885 prohibited most8 6 corpo-
rations from participating in any campaign activity in a state referen-
dum or election, including the making of financial expenditures and
contributions. The corporate litigants 87 in Bellotti, while planning to
255. Therefore appellant's claims were unsuccessful. Id. However in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1924) the Court granted a corporate school the protection against being deprived
property without the due process afforded by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 535-36. The
Court noted that corporations generally could not make such claims. Id. at 535. However, here
appellees' business was threatened. The Court granted them injunctive relief, after describing the
positive force of the school in the community. Id. See supra note 80.
80. Compare Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924) with Northwestern National
Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1960). The different ruling on these due process claims
is a function of the type of corporate entities involved. In Pierce, the corporation was an estab-
lished school for secular and religious education; in Northwestern, appellant was a large life insur-
ance company. The Courts' opinions demonstrate a significant difference in concern for these
litigants and their value to natural citizens within their communities. See 268 U.S. at 531, 535-36;
203 U.S. at 251-55.
81. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
82. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
83. Id.
84. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, §8 (Law. Coop. 1981). For a discussion concerning the
constitutional history of the Massachusetts statute see opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court, 371 Mass. 773, 778-80, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1266-68 (1977). For a discussion of similar
state statutes see supra note 18.
85. Section 8 states in part:
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank, .. no company having the right to
take land by eminent domain .... no trustee or trustees owning or holding the majority
of the stock of such a corporation, no business corporation incorporated under the laws
of or doing business in the commonwealth and no officer or agent acting in behalf of any
corporation mentioned in this section, shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or
contribute, or promise to give, pay, expend or contribute, any money or other valuable
thing for the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination or election of
any person to public office, or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of any
political party, or influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the vot-
ers, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the
corporation....
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, §8 (Law. Coop. 1981).
86. See supra note 85.
87. The suit was brought by the First National Bank of Boston, New England Merchants
National Bank, The Gilette Company, Digital Equipment Corporation, and the Wyman-Gordon
Company against the State of Massachusetts. 371 Mass. 773, 773 n.1, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1262
(1977).
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advertise their opposition88 to a proposed graduated income tax refer-
endum,8 9 had been threatened with criminal prosecutions by the Mas-
sachusetts Attorney General. Subsequently, they brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of the statute.90 In a unanimous deci-
sion the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the statute
did not violate the free speech rights of the corporate litigants.91 First,
the court noted that corporations were not entitled to the same degree
of first amendment protection as natural persons;92 their rights only ex-
tended to areas materially affecting their business or property assets.
93
Second, agreeing that a graduated income tax did not so affect a corpo-
ration,94 the court upheld the statute as it applied to the plaintiffs.95
In a five to four decision the United States Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the Massachusetts court.96 Writing for the majority,
Justice Powell explained that the focus of the lower court should not
have been whether corporations have first amendment rights coexistent
with those of natural persons.97 Instead, the proper question was
whether section 8 abridged the kind of expression that the first amend-
ment was designed to protect. 98 The Bellotti majority found that it
did.99
The Bellotti decision does not establish an independently protected
right of corporations to speak,00 for the Court did not define the con-
stitutional status of corporations' first amendment rights.10' Conse-
quently, the Court avoided tackling the major constitutional
controversy underlying the case. Instead the decision established that
any "right" that corporate entities might have to freedom of speech
derives solely from the public's "right to listen.""0 2
88. 371 Mass. at 774-76, 359 N.E.2d at 1265-66.
89. The proposal would have permitted the legislature to have established a graduated in-
come tax on individuals. 371 Mass. at 774 n.3, 359 N.E.2d at 1265.
90. Id. at 776, 359 N.E.2d at 1265.
91. Id. at 785, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
92. Id. at 783-85, 359 N.E.2d at 1269-70.
93. Id. at 784-87, 359 N.E.2d at 1270-72.
94. Id. Section 8 explicitly states that no referenda dealing solely with a question of taxation
"shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation." MAss.
GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 55, §8. The Court found this provision of §8 neither overbroad nor void for
vagueness. 371 Mass. at 787-91, 359 N.E.2d at 1272-74.
95. 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262.
96. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
97. Id. at 777-78.
98. Id. at 778. The Court found the former question to be only an "abstract question." Id.
99. Id. at 795.
100. See id. at 777, 776-780.
101. See supra note 98; Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 438
(1982) (city election ordinance violated individual's freedom of association); Federal Election
Commission v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (violation of 2 U.S.C. §441b by
corporate officer); Nicholson, supra note 8, at 953-58. But see Miller, supra note 76, at 22; Patton,
supra note 8, at 495.
102. See 435 U.S. at 777-86. By tying corporate speech to the constitutionally protected rights
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The Court based its opinion on Meiklejohn's theory of the first
amendment. 103 Any political expression worth hearing should receive
first amendment protection since its primary function is to provide the
listening public with a multitude of diverse views1t 4  Thus a court
should not ask whether corporate speech per se is protected, but
whether that speech receives protection because of the public's right to
listen.'0 5 Under Bellotti, the sources of the speech is irrelevant10 6 since
corporate political speech receives protection through its reliance on
the rights of listeners.'
0 7
This rationale is similar to that employed in the commercial speech
cases.' 0 8 The Bellotti Court completely rejected the lower court's deci-
sion providing protection only to corporations materially affected by
the referendum. 0 9 The Court also rejected the argument that only me-
dia corporations, such as an incorporated television station or newspa-
per, could claim first amendment protection. 110 Instead, the
constitutional protections cover corporate communications containing
useful information to listeners."'I Only the presence of a strong risk of
corruption would have been a sufficient governmental interest to up-
hold the statute. 1 2 According to Justice Powell, such a risk is not pres-
ent in a referendum campaign."
3
of listeners, the Court established corporate speech as dependent, but not necessarily subordinate
to another protected right. For a discussion on this right to listen see supra notes 34-37 and ac-
companying text. See Note, The Right to Know and the School Board Censorsho of Hgh School
BookAcquisition, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1115, 1124-31 (1977).
103. See 435 U.S. at 776-78, 777 & n.ll. See supra text and accompanying notes 34-37.
104. 435 U.S. at 776-78.
105. Id. at 783.
106. Id. at 777.
107. Id. at 775-86. See Nicholson, supra note 8 at 952-58.
108. See supra notes 47-54.
109. 435 U.S. at 781-85.
110. Id. The Court noted that the institutional press does not "have a monopoly on either the
First Amendment or the ability to enlighten." Id. at 782. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972) (newsmen have no special privilege allowing them to avoid testifying before a
grand jury); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 n.56 (1976). Chief Justice Burger expressed
concern that imposing serious restrictions on corporations' first amendment rights may serious
undermine freedom of the institutional press. 435 U.S. at 796-802. Burger noted that many news-
papers now exist as part of large congomerates. In his concurring opinion, the Chief Justice sug-
gests the Court should clearly provide first amendment protection to all who engage in speech, not
just corporate entities. Id. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See generally Comment, Freedom of
Speech: First NationalBank ofBoston v. Bellotti, 48 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 96, 103 (1979) (Massachu-
setts statute posed special problems for media corporations). Justice Rehnquist in his concurring
opinion responded. He noted that corporations chartered for the purpose of carrying on the busi-
ness of a newspaper cannot be deprived of liberty of the free press. 435 U.S. at 824 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (newspaper corporations'
requisite first amendment protection violated by state statute). See generally Miller, supra note 76,
at 38 (communication is the reason newspaper corporations exist).
111. 435 U.S. at 783.
112. Id. at 788-93. See generally Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (speech will not be
restricted absent a clear and present danger to political system).
113. 435 U.S. at 780 n.26, 789. The Court has recently found unconstitutional other election
laws restricting campaign contributions made to referendum campaigns. Citizens Against Rent
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Yet, it would be unwise to infer from the Bellotti opinion that corpo-
rate political speech is necessarily either subordinate or equivalent to
the rights of the listeners. The Court explicitly stated that commercial
speech could exist only so long as it benefited society.1 14 If the rights of
the public were infringed by the rights of speakers, the former would
prevail. The Bellotti Court, however, failed to explain how such a con-
flict would be resolved within the arena of corporate political speech.
Two POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
By defining corporate political speech as dependent on the rights of
listeners, the Bellotti Court failed to indicate the relative degree of pro-
tection afforded each. Consequently, the Court delayed resolving the
major constitutional question at hand. In addition, by failing to find
the possibility of either perceived or actual corruption in referendum
campaigns, the Court gave no indication whether the corruption ration-
ale could aid in supporting the constitutional validity of section 441b.
Focusing on these two issues in future decisions may prompt the Court
to reach the constitutional issue underlying the statute and thus define
the degree of protection owing to corporate entities.
A. Freedom of Speech: Rights of Listeners v. Rights of Corporations
The appellees in Bellotti argued that the Massachusetts statute was a
necessary government tool for restraining corporations from inordi-
nately influencing the electoral system. 1 5 The Court strongly rejected
that argument."16
The majority did note, however, that if appellees had provided suffi-
cient documentary evidence of corporate involvement "undermining
the democratic processes. . . [and]. . . denigrating. . . First Amend-
ment interests," the Court would have examined their argument." 7
Thus, evidence that corporate speech interferes and conflicts with the
Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434 (1982). In doing so the Court noted that the corruption
rational is not a compalling governmental interest in referendum campaigns. Id. at 439. This
approach provides little hope for municipalities wishing to impose such restrictions in their refer-
endum campaigns. However the concurring statement of four justices indicate the Court may be
willing to uphold a less restrictive statutory scheme. See Id. at 439-41. See generally Note,
Preventing Corruption in the ElectoralProcess: The California Supreme Court Expands the Buckley
v. Valeo A4nalysis of Campaign Finance Regulation to Non-Candidate Elections, 3 WHITrIER L.
REV. 431 (1981) (develops an expansionist definition of "corruption").
114. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
764-771 (1975).
115. Brief for Appellee at 32-41, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
116. 435 U.S. at 788-92.
117. 435 U.S. at 788-92; f. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969), as cited
in 435 U.S. at 791 (interests were sufficient to uphold regulation). In Bellotti, Appellee's corpora-
tion domination argument was supported by inconclusive statistics that were easily refuted by
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rights of the public to listen would enable the Court to consider restric-
tion of that right."1 8 This evidence would negate the Bellotti premise
that increased speech from all sources results in a more vibrant political
debate. 19 Moreover, resolving this conflict would require the Court to
establish the parameters of the right of corporate speech.
Evidence of this conflict, now available, demonstrates that as corpo-
rate interests achieve increased access to the political marketplace, the
listening public has an inversely proportionate opportunity to listen to
diverse viewpoints.' 2 Studies show that as this causal relationship de-
velops, the political power of corporations increases, thus negating the
Bellotti premise.' 2' As corporations achieve greater access to the polit-
ical marketplace, through campaign contributions and independent ex-
penditures, there is a tendency for noncorporate individuals to be
increasingly limited in their relative political speech. Consequently,
accessibility of the listening public to diverse political views is signifi-
cantly eroded.' 22
Clear examples of corporate domination of the political marketplace
can be found in studies of select 1976 Colorado referenda cam-
paigns. 123 In that year Colorado citizens voted in state and federal can-
didate elections," as well as on ten state referenda questions. 125 Four
Justice Powell. Compare 435 U.S. at 810-12 with id. at 789 n.28 (interpretation of statistics by
majority and the dissent).
118. 435 U.S. at 789.
119. This premise stems from the theoretical genesis of the Court's opinion - Meiklejohn's
"marketplace of ideas" theory. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37 & 103-107.
120. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 443-44, 443 nn.3-4
(1982) (White, J., dissenting); Voter Initiative Constitutional,4mendment: Hearings on Si Res. 67
Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Congr., 1st
Sess. 172 (1977) (statement of J. Shockley, Ph.D) [hereinafter cited as Shockley]; Mastro, Costlow
& Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process through Media
Spending and What To Do About It, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 315 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mastro].
See generally Note, supra note 113, at 454-59 (evidence available for proving deleterious corporate
impact).
121. See, e.g., supra notes 123-149 and accompanying text.
122. Id.
123. See generally Mastro, supra note 120; Shockley, supra note 120. The Colorado referenda
are highlighted in this article because of the extensive material available on these campaigns.
Other studies are also available that support a similar hypothesis. See S. LYDENBERG, BANKROL-
LING BALLOTS: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN FINANCING STATE BALLOT QUESTION CAMPAIGNS 37
(1979), discussed in Citizens Against Rent Control, 102 S. Ct. at 434, n.3. Lydenberg provides three
California examples where "corporate" contributions far exceeded "non-corporate" interests. Id.;
Address by D. Lowenstein, American Political Science Association, Annual Convention, Cam-
paign Spending and Ballot Propositions (Sept. 5, 1981), discussed in 102 S. Ct. at 434 n.4. Lowen-
stein demonstrates impact of negative one-sided spending. Id.
124. See Shockley, supra note 120, at 175, 177. Colorado citizens participated in the selection
of the President, numerous United States Congressional seats, eighteen State Senate positions and
sixty-five spots in the State House. Id.
125. Id. at 178. Briefly, the referenda dealt with (1) a proposed state sweepstakes, (2) a
mobile home tax, (3) increased regulation of nuclear power development, (4) altering the Gover-
nor's appointment powers, (5) power of county commissioners to set salaries, (6) repeal of the state
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of these referenda are particularly useful in demonstrating the conflict
between the first amendment rights of corporations and natural per-
sons.126 Each referendum focused upon controversial subjects, and was
E.R.A., (7) repeal of a food sales tax, (8) bottle deposit and recycling system, (9) establishing a
consumer advocate for public utilities, (10) voter approval of tax increases. Referenda number (1)
and (2) created little voter interest. See id.
126. These are referenda numbers three, seven, eight and nine. For a discussion of referen-
dum number three, calling for nuclear power regulation, see infra note 128. Referendum number
seven would have repealed the state tax on food and provided for a replacement of this revenue by
a corporate income tax. See Shockley, su.pra note 120, at 181-85. Not surprisingly corporate
interests mounted a strong campaign against this proposal. For an excellent discussion on the
tactics used by the tremendously well-financed corporate opposition, see id. In this referendum
campaign, proponents of the measure had available a total of $22,484 in financial contributions, or
approximately six percent of the total. Opponents had available $361,000, or approximately
ninety-four percent of the total. See chart below. Although polls taken in September showed
proponents of the measure favored to win by a wide margin, by election day opponents reversed
this prediction and soundly defeated the measure. Id. For a discussion on referendum number
eight, a bottle deposit proposal, see infra text and accompanying notes 134-141. Referendum
number nine would have altered the public utility system's operation. See supra notes 143-144
and accompanying text.
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expected to have negative impact on incorporated organizations. 127
This triggered a high degree of corporate political activity, 128 including
strong corporate opposition. 129 Corporate money flowed freely and
openly in the state referenda debates. Although section 441b precluded
corporate involvement in the federal election campaigns,3 0 Colorado
law did not establish similar restrictions in any of the state
campaigns.' 3
An examination of the four referenda demonstrate that corporate
speakers participated without limit in making campaign contributions
and expenditures. 32 Yet, in opposition to the referenda, proponents
neither represented nor supported by vested economic interests were
unable to expend relatively significant funds in support of their posi-
tion. 133 Consequently, the public's access to alternative views was ex-
tremely limited. One referendum, for example, would have instituted a
mandatory refundable bottle deposit and a recycling system on all bev-
erage containers sold in the state. 34 Large bottling companies, fearing
127. See, e.g., infra notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
128. For example, referendum number three would have required a two-thirds majority vote
of the state legislature before additional nuclear building or modification could be made. It also
could have required extensive public hearings before the legislature could vote on the construc-
tion. Finally the referendum would have required the waiver of federally imposed liability limits
for damages resulting from any plant's operation. Not surprisingly nuclear corporate interests
wanted this measure defeated. They outspent proponents by more than four-to-one. Corporate
financial support of $500 or more provided two-thirds of this side's total campaign funds. See
Mastro, supra note 1220, at 321.
129. See Mastro, supra note 120, at 320-23. One indication of the high degree of corporate
activity is demonstrated by the opponents political contributions, relative to proponents. See
chart, supra note 126. The intensity of the issues involved in the referenda themselves is demon-
strated by a comparison between the total amount of financial contributions made to the referenda
and the state candidate elections. Total expenditures for the state House and Senate seats was
about $750,000. Total expenditures for all ten referenda campaigns was approximately
$2,250,000. See Shockley, supra note 120, at 177.
130. 2 U.S.C. §441b (1976). See supra note 9. See Shockley, supra note 120, at 172.
131. See Shockley, supra note 120, at 172. See COLORADO REV. STAT. §1-45-101-121 (1977).
The emphasis in the Colorado "Campaign Reform Act of 1974" is on disclosure. Id. §101. For a
comparison of the amount of money expended by "corporate" interests, as opposed to "non-
corporate" interests, see chart, supra note 126. In the four referenda referred to in this text, propo-
nents, generally corporations, outspent opponents by a ratio of approximately ten-to-one,
$1,735,000 to $178,000. For comparisons of other referenda, see Shockley, supra note 120, at 177.
132. See Shockley, supra note 120, at 177-89.
133. See id. One could argue that although the statistics demonstrate that the opponents had
significantly greater financial resources, their impact is negated by other statistics showing that
both sides were accoided almost equivalent access to the major media sources, the key measure of
communicating with the public. For example, in the nuclear referendum, number three, "propo-
nents" total television air time was 130 thirty-second advertisements; "opponents" had 145. See
Mastro, supra note 120, at 325. However "opponents" were able to purchase 113 advertisements
during "prime time," the period with the highest viewing audience. "Proponents" could only
afford to purchase thirty-four such advertisements. See Id. at 325, 361-62, Tables Ila, Ilb. It is
generally conceded that "prime time" is more valuable to the advertiser due to the greater number
of people watching television during that time period. Thus a comparison of the number of adver-
tisements, broken down by their approximate viewing audience only serves to support the argu-
ment that "opponents" were afforded tremendous advantages in reaching potential voters due to
their superior financial resources. Id. at 325-27.
134. This referendum, number eight, appeared on the ballot as: "An Act to require a mini-
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a decline in a demand for their products, 35 collected campaign contri-
butions exceeding by twenty-seven to one those of the referendum's
proponents. 136 The other three referenda demonstrated similar imbal-
ances.' 37 Large shifts in opinion resulted from such unbalanced spend-
ing.13 Polls conducted prior to the campaign 39 predicted passage of
each referendum by significant margins. 40  However, following four
heavily financed, one-sided campaigns, just the opposite occurred.' 4 1
Another of the referenda would have established significant burdens on
the public utility systems in Colorado.' 42  In late September a poll
showed only nineteen percent of the public in opposition to the propo-
sal.' 43 Approval therefore seems likely; however, the opponents were
victorious on election day, garnering seventy percent of the votes. 44
Thus, as corporate speech entered the political marketplace, public
access to diverse views on the referenda declined. 45  Subsequently, in
all four cases, public support for the referenda shifted significantly. 146
Though there may be numerous and contradictory explanations for
mum deposit refund value for beverage containers for malt liquor, including beer, and carbonated
soft drinks manufactured, distributed, or sold for use in this state; to require recycling or reuse of
returned beverage containers and to provide civil penalties for violations." See Mastro, supra
note 120, at 322 n.22.
135. Opponents of the referendum (and their financial support) included the Can Manufactur-
ers Institute, ($65,971), the American Iron & Steel Institute ($23,438), Coca-Cola Company
($25,000), Owens-Illinois ($33,200), the Aluminum Association, Inc. ($26,910) and Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. ($33,000). These six contributors alone outspent all proponents combined. See Mas-
tro, supra note 120, at 321-22. They claimed the proposal was an inadequate remedy for a serious
state problem. The opposition then claimed that the goal of the referendum, eradicating litter in
the state, could be better accomplished by passage of a "model litter law." See Shockley, supra
note 120, at 185-86.
136. Id. at 185.
137. The approximate ratios in the other four referenda were (#3) 5:1, (;;7) 16:1. (;8) 26:1
and (#9) 16:1. See Shockley, supra note 120, at 178, Table III; Chart, supra note 126. For a
breakdown of media expenditures by referenda, see Matro, supra note 120, at 325-26.
138. See chart, supra note 126.
139. Polls were conducted in May, July, September, and October by both hired consultants
and neutral observers. See Shockley, supra note 120, at 179.
140. For exact indications of the public's support for the referendum early in the campaign,
see chart, supra note 126, Column III.
141. For referenda results, see id, Column IV. For a measure of the change in public support
from the beginning of the campaign to the day of the election, see Column V.
142. This referendum, number nine, appeared on the ballot as: "An Act to protect and repre-
sent consumers of public utilities services by creating a Department of Public Counselor, and
concerning financial disclosures by Public Utilities Commissioners and the Public Counselor, ap-
proval of the issuance of telephone and telegraph company securities, the burden of proof for
utility companies seeking rate increases, criminal and civil remedies for violations of this Act,judicial review of Public Utilities Commission decisions, and purposes and procedures of the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission." Mastro, supra note 120, at 322 n.23.
143. Mastro, supra note 120, at 360; Denver Post, October 31, 1976 at 13, as citedin Mastro at
360, Table I, column three. See chart, supra note 126, Columns III-V.
144. Id.
145. This proposition is supported by the statistics discussed above. See chart, supra note 126,
Columns III-V. As corporate speech became more pervasive, the relative presence of non-corpo-
rate speech became insignificant.
146. See chart, supra note 126, Column V.
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these shifts, 147 existence of highly financed, generally one-sided cam-
paigns, followed by significant shifts in public opinion is only now rele-
vant. These statistics alone indicate that in the conflict between the
public's right to listen and first amendment expression, it is the public
who suffers.
According to the Bellotti Court, corporate speech receives protection
so long as it contributes to the diversity of views received by the listen-
ing public.148 The imbalanced impact of corporate speech in Colorado
demonstrates that this type of expression, in some cases, may conflict
with the protected constitutional rights of the public to hear and to be
heard. Thus, when faced with a challenge to section 441b, and
presented with this type of evidence, the Court will determine the cor-
porate right of free speech by determining the validity of the statute.149
B. Corruption in the Political Arena
A second method exists for determining the degree of constitutional
protection to be afforded a corporation. It focuses on the need to eradi-
cate corruption from the political process. In 1976, the Supreme Court
147. For example, the referenda's opponents, when presented with this evidence, reject the
argument that their superior financial resources allowed them to "buy" the elections. Shockley,
supra _note 120, at 178. They argue that these significant changes in public opinion reflect thepublic's valid assessment of the issues involved. The Denver Post criticized the charge that dis-
parate financial resources influenced the outcomes. Such criticisms were an "'insult to the voter'sintellgence'... 'To tell him after the results are in that he was manipulated 
- because he voted
"wrong" - is the ultimate in contempt.'" Shockley, supra note 120, at 179.
148. See 435 U.S. at 776-78, 782-84. The Court noted that, in part, communication corpora-
tions received constitutional protection because of their role in "affording the public access to
discussion, debate and the dissemination of information and ideas." Id. at 783.
149. See infra notes 202-203 and accompanying text. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 440 (1982). In Rent Control, an eight-to-one decision, the Court held
unconstitutional a Berkeley municipal election ordinance limiting all contributions to any political
committee to $250 for city-wide referenda. Id. at 435-36. Dissenting in Rent Control, Justice
White argued that the contribution limitations should have been upheld. Id. at 441-45 (White, J.,
dissenting). Citing to numerous studies, including those by Drs. Shockley & Mastro, described
earlier, Justice White noted that it is not possible to show that heavy spending "buys" a campaign
victory. However, "Inhere is increasing evidence" of large contributors' significant influence in
the electoral process. Id. at 443. See also notes 120-149 and accompanying text (Shockley &
Mastro studies). The Court ignored Justice White's evidence. Three concurring judges note that
the record before the Court with this evidence still failed to demonstrate that as a result of corpo-
rate domination of the electoral process, there was a "genuine threat" to the City's interest in
maintaining voter confidence in government." Id. at 440 (Blackmun and O'Connor, J.J., concur-
ring). See also id. (Marshall, J., concurring). However, from the statements made in these concur-
ring opinions, it appears such evidence may likely receive greater credibility, in defending
statutory prohibitions of corporate political behavior. This would result only if the evidence was
(1) a specific study focusing on the jurisdiction enacting the statute, or (2) a study specifically
relied on by a legislative body in enacting the corporate restrictions. See id. at 441. It appears that
five members of the present Court may countenance use of this evidence in one of the above
prescribed manners to uphold corporate campaign restrictions and prohibitions similar to §441b.
See id. at 439-40 (Marshall, J.); 440-41 (Blackmun and O'Connor, J.J.), 441-45 (White, J.). Justice
Rehnquist has noted his favorable predisposition towards narrowly drawn corporate prohibitions.
See id. at 439; 435 U.S. at 822-28. See also infra note 202.
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in Buckley v. Valeo 150 held constitutional the 1974 amendment to sec-
tion 608(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act. 51 The section was
found to effectively deter corruption in the electoral process-a "suffi-
ciently important" governmental interest. 52 This provision established
a $1,000 limitation on campaign contributions made by individuals and
noncorporate entities, to political candidates in federal elections.' 53
In Belloti, appellees similarly tried to support the Massachusetts
statute's corporate prohibitions by arguing the applicability of the cor-
ruption rationale.'5 4 The Bellotti Court noted that corruption often oc-
curs in elections when large contributions are given to political
candidates by individual citizens in order to secure a quidpro quo.' 5
Referenda, however, do not involve candidates and therefore, accord-
ing to the Court, the possibility of quidpro quos and their resulting
corruption was not present in the case before it.'5 6
Unfortunately, this approach precluded the Court from examining
whether the corruption rationale would be applicable to corporate con-
tributions in candidate elections.' 57 Consideration of this question in
150. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
151. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §608b, 88 Stat.
1263 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §441a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). For a thorough discussion of the
Act's provisions as enacted, and as effected by the Buckley litigation, see Nicholson, supra note 8,
at 947 n.8. The Federal Election Act's 1974 amendments were passed as a response to the abuses
of power demonstrated by the Nixon Administration during Watergate. See generally Nicholson,
Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign ActAmendments of 1974,
1977 Wisc. L. REv. 323. See generally FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (1977) (includes all proposed
amendments, floor debates and other statements).
152. 424 U.S. at 25. Appellees argued that the statutory restrictions were supported by three
government interests: (1) preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption; (2) equalizing
all voices in the political process by limiting "affluent persons"' ability to make contributions;
(3) establishing a ceiling on skyrocketing campaign costs. Id. at 25-26. In this portion of the
opinion, the Court here found the first interest valid. Id. at 26-29. Later, the second and third
interests were held insufficient to uphold the Amendment's $1,000 expenditure limitations by indi-
viduals on behalf of a "clearly identifiable" candidate. Id. at 39-51. The Court found the statute
ineffective in reaching its goal, because "resourceful" persons seeking influence could easily devise
ways of avoiding the restrictions. Id. at 45. Also, the Court found less likelihood of corruption in
the area of independent expenditures. Id. at 46-47. Finally, the idea of equalizing natural persons
influence in elections was described as "wholly foreign" to the first amendment. Id. at 48-50.
Thus only the first governmental interest seems to have survived Buckley. See Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 434-35 (1928); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F.
Supp. 489, 494 (1980), a ff'd 101 S. Ct. 3140 (1981).
153. 18 U.S.C. §608Co)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(l)(A) (1976)).
154. See 435 U.S. at 790.
155. Id.
156. Id.; cf 424 U.S. at 26-30. In Buckley the statute only affected candidate elections since
there are no referenda held on the federal level. See generally Voter Initiative Constitutional
Amendment: Hearings on S.J Res. 67 Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposal for national referendum). For a discus-
sion concerning a new conception of "corruption," see Note, supra note 113, at 450-54.
157. Had the Court found the corruption rationale applicable to referendum campaigns, the
level of scrutiny afforded corporate political speech would most likely have been articulated.
Once the Court acknowledged the possibility of corruption in referenda, the next step would have
been to determine whether corporations" constitutional rights had been violated by the Massachu-
setts statute.
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the future would have significant implications. In determining the suf-
ficiency of the governmental interest in upholding the statute, the Court
would likely indicate the level of scrutiny to be accorded corporate
political speech, thereby delineating the potential bounds of corporate
political speech.
Furthermore, a substantive analysis of the corruption rationale dem-
onstrates a valid compelling governmental interest in upholding section
441b. The published report of the United States Senate's Watergate
Committee 5 8 and findings by the lower court in Buckley, 159 for exam-
ple, provide extensive details of illegal corporate campaign contribu-
tions made to the 1972 re-election campaigns of President Nixon 160 and
members of the United States Congress. 16  Corporate managers mak-
ing contributions assumed that corporate financial support for these
campaigns was a necessary prerequisite to obtaining government con-
tracts, and to insuring favorable legislative considerations. 162 Strict en-
forcement of section 441b then precludes direct corporate political
participation and insulates the political process from corruption.
THE LOWER COURTS AND CORPORATE POLITICAL FREE
SPEECH RIGHTS
Although the United States Supreme Court has failed to address di-
rectly the constitutional issue implicit in a challenge to section 441b, 163
several lower courts have done SO. 16 4  An examination of these deci-
158. FINAL REPORT, supra note 24. The Select Committee on Presidential Activities was
formed pursuant to SJ. Res. 60 in the ninety-third Congress. Its function was to investigate the
extent to which "'illegal, improper, or unethical activities'" occured in the 1972 Presidential elec-
tion. Id. at V, "Letter of Transmittal."
159. 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 & nn. 36-38 (D.C. Cir. 1975), ag'd 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
160. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 579-867. This chapter of the report deals with
illegal milk-price supports arranged for leading dairy cooperatives by President Nixon and his
campaign associates. The document demonstrates a series of "corrupt" acts by government offi-
cials and the dairy industry. In exchange for the approximately $2 million in campaign pledges
made to the Nixon 1972 re-election campaign, the milk producers received benefits worth "tens of
millions of dollars." Id. at 579passim.
161. 519 F.2d at 839 n.37.
162. Id. The court found the record replete with examples of political contributions motivated
(1) "by the perception that this was necessary as a 'calling card, something that would get us in the
door and make our point of view heard,'" and (2) by "improper attempts to obtain government
favors in return for large campaign contributions." Id. The "Watergate Committee's" Report
abounds with examples of either illegal or unethical solitication by Nixon associates of the leaders
of at least sixty different American industries for campaign contributions to the Nixon re-election
fund. FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 446-92, 548-50. The report details the "sale" of ambassa-
dorships by the Nixon Administration in a level unprecedented in U.S. electoral history. Id. at
492-505.
163. See supra note 6.
164. Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 635 F.2d 1132, 1139-42 (5th Cir. 1981), cen. denied
101 S. Ct. 3151 (1981) (bank overdrafts do not constitute political speech, therefore there was no
first amendment abridgement by the statute); Federal Election Comm'n v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp.
243, 246-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (corporate expenditures are less protected than those of natural per-
sons'); United States v. Chestnut, 394 F. Supp. 581, 587-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 533 F.2d 40 (2d
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sions demonstrates the need for a careful balance of corporate and in-
dividual rights. In United States v. Chestnut, 6 5 for example, the federal
district court refused to dismiss an indictment which charged Chestnut,
manager of a United States Senate campaign, with violating section
441b by accepting a corporate campaign contribution. 66 Upon balanc-
ing the first amendment interests of corporations against the substantial
governmental interests of maintaining the legitimacy of the electoral
process, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.' 67 This
balancing facilitates identification of the relevant interests involved.
Similarly, the majority of other lower court opinions have upheld
related provisions of section 441b.168 They have failed, however, to re-
solve conflicting first amendment interests, 69 and have neither used
nor provided a theoretical basis for their decisions.
In Federal Election Commission v. Weinsten,17° for instance, the
Southern District of New York upheld the constitutionality of a subsec-
Cir. 1976) (statute is least drastic means to accomplish Congress's purpose); United States v. Clif-
ford, 409 F. Supp. 1070, 1072-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (statute is neither vague nor an abuse of Con-
gressional power considering Congress's regulation of national banks); United States v. First
National Bank of Cincinnati, 329 F. Supp. 1251, 1254 (S.D. Ohio 1971), a'd 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.
1976) (prohibitions on fully secured loans violate first amendment). But see United States v.
Lewis Food Company, 366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1966) (Court refuses to reach constitutional issue);
Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227, 232 (E.D. Pa. 1972) af'd 471 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd on
rehearing 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), rev'd 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (court's construction of "expenditure"
precludes reading the constitutional issue); United States v. Anchorage Central Labor Council,
193 F. Supp. 504, 508 (D. Alaska 1961) (voluntary contributions to television fund do not raise
constitutional issue).
165. 394 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd, 553 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1976).
166. Chestnut, a campaign aide of Hubert Humphrey, arranged for the American Milk Produ-
cers, Inc. to pay Humphrey's senate election campaign advertising fees for one month. Id. at 583.
Defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §610 (1970) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §441b
(1976). 394 F. Supp. at 538.
167. 394 F. Supp. at 587-91. The court felt it important to weigh corporate first amendment
rights with the interests of both preserving the electoral process and protecting stockholders and
union members who may not wish to contribute to a campaign. Id. at 590. See Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Ratner, supra note 8, at 24-26.
168. See supra note 164.
169. Of those courts that have reached the constitutional issue, most did so on very narrow
grounds. As a result few of the lower court opinions are very helpful in resolving the constitu-
tional issue implicit in §441b. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 635 F.2d 1132, 1139-
42 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. denied 101 S. Ct. 3151 (1981). In Lance, defendant-appellant, T. Bertram
Lance, former candidate for governor of the State of Georgia, challenged the validity of §441b in
its entirety. 2 U.S.C. §441b (1976). Lance sought to challenge the Act in order to resist enforce-
ment of an administrative subpoena requiring him to appear with certain documents before the
Federal Election Commission. The subpoena was filed in conjunction with an investigation of
possible illegal overdrafts made to the 1974 Lance campaign. 635 F.2d at 1133-35. The court
rejected his broad-based challenge, and narowed his appeal solely to a challenge of §441b's prohi-
bition on bank loans and overdrafts. Id. at 1139-41. See 2 U.S.C. §441b(a), (b)(2) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980). Reaching the issue of bank overdrafts, the court found that such non-public support
contained "no speech elements at all." 635 F.2d at 1141. Therefore there could be no first amend-
ment violation. The Court noted its opinion was limited only to the specific provision concerning
banking activities. Id. at 1142 n.7. The Court also rejected Lance's equal protection claims, find-
ing the statute passed the lower "rationality" standard, triggered by this alleged "non speech"
action. Id. at 1142. A more successful equal protection challenge to §441b might emerge in the
future, if it is based on a more overt form of speech.
170. 462 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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tion of section 441b as it was applied against a corporate campaign
contributor.1 71  Contrary to the Supreme Court's approach in Bel-
lotti,172 the Weinsten opinion focused on the perceived uselessness of
corporate speech. No consideration was given to the interests of the
listening public in receiving corporate speech. 173 This court's analysis
is flawed, for it fails to grasp the immutable conflict between the free
speech rights of corporations and natural persons.74 In finding corpo-
rate rights subordinate to personal rights, the court granted relief solely
on the deleterious impact of corporate speech on the political process,
rather than resolving the inherent conflicting interests. 75 Future con-
sideration of the constitutionality of section 441b requires a balancing
process that will consider the corporate free speech interests which were
neglected by the Weinsten Court.'
76
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, a framework for establish-
ing the bounds of corporate political speech is available. First, the
Court must acknowledge the necessity of resolving the constitutional
issue underlying section 441b: whether corporate entities are entitled to
first amendment protections equivalent to that of natural persons. Two
rationales are available to resolve the question. The Court could note
the conflict of free speech rights established in Bellotti 177 and evidenced
171. In Weinsten, a corporate executive tried to avoid the Act's prohibition. To accomplish
this, he distributed corporate funds to employees who then wrote personal checks to the presiden-
tial campaign of Governor Milton Shapp. Id. at 245-46.
172. 435 U.S. at 788-96. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
173. 462 F. Supp. at 249. The court focused primarily on the theoretical basis articulated in
Justice White's opinion in Belloti. Id. See 435 U.S. at 802-23. Whites opinion was based on the
second first amendment theory discussed earlier: promoting individual self-expression, self-reali-
zation and self-fulfillment. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. In this way, the Weinslen
Court ignored Justice Powell's first amendment premise that speech is protected in order to pro-
vide for a wealth of information in the political marketplace. See Note, Municipal Free Speech:
Banned in Boston, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 1111, 1114-17 (1979). See supra notes 103-107 and ac-
companying text.
174. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
175. 462 F. Supp. at 249-50. Focusing on the speaker, rather than the listeners, as the
Supreme Court requires, the Wensten court found the corporate prohibitions constitutional. Al-
though the court's conclusion may be valid, its arguments are somewhat conclusory and vague.
For example, the Weinsten court argues that corporate "contributions by themselves say lit-
tle ..... Id. at 249. The court does not explicitly explain why corporate contributions "say
little," except notes that "given the realities and expense of modern communications. . . [corpo-
rate contributions] ... may permit the indirect purchase of votes." Id. Thus the court means not
that corporate speech has little impact, but that its value to society is minimal. Although the
court's concern for the power of corporate entities is relevant, its failure to provide the political
marketplace access to corporate views is contrary to the framework established by the Court in
Bellotl. Id.; 435 U.S. at 777-79. See infra note 181.
176. For an example of this approach, see Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2358-60 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). Ste-
vens' opinion balanced the States' interest in suppression of corporate commercial speech with a
corporation's goal in speaking. In that particular instance, the latter was viewed as superior. Id.
at 59. For an example of this balancing within another context, see Brown v. Glines, 100 S. Ct.
594 (1980) (Air Force regulation restricting individual's communication did not violate first
amendment).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 115-122.
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by the Colorado referenda 7 ' and similar studies,179 or the Court could
recognize the applicability of the Buckley corruption rationale to all
elections for public office.' 80  Prior to adopting either rationale, how-
ever, the Court must balance the interests of corporations and natural
persons in corporate political free speech.' 8 ' Protection would be ex-
tended to corporations on the basis of this balancing, but only so long
as the general interests of natural citizens would not be hampered.'
82
POLICY ISSUES AND BALANCING THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF
CORPORATE AND NATURAL PERSONS
A final determination of the bounds of corporate political free speech
will affect the continued viability of section 441b. If corporations are
afforded the full free speech rights available to natural persons, then
section 441b would likely be invalid, for the statute clearly restrains
corporate speech.' 83 However, granting such protections may pose sig-
nificant dangers to natural persons' first amendment rights. 184 The
Court in Bellotti established that any protected corporate political free
speech rights must derive from the rights of the listening public to be
exposed to a diversity of views.' 5 The Colorado studies established
that unlimited corporate political speech is likely to conflict with and
subordinate the free speech right of natural persons.'8 6 These studies
and policy re-evaluations as discussed above, demonstrate the necessity
of establishing a hierarchy of free speech rights between corporate and
natural persons.
Determining the constitutionality of section 441b necessitates consid-
eration of two conflicting concerns. Corporate access to the political
process assists in the security and continuity of corporate growth and
investment; 187 however, unlimited access may lead to corporate domi-
178. See supra text accompanying notes 123-49.
179. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text; infra note 202 and accompanying text.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 150-56.
181. Applying either rationale would prompt resolution of a conflict between corporate and
natural persons' free speech rights. Such a resolution involves subordinating the interests of one
to the other by establishing a hierarchical valuation of corporate and natural persons' speech
interests. However unlike the court's approach in Weinsten, this valuing, based on current public
policy concerns, should be rooted in the framework established by the Court in BelloUl. 462 F.
Supp. at 249-50; 435 U.S. at 776-80.
182. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 145-48.
185. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 123-49 and accompanying text. See also supra note 120.
187. This proposition seems to be the premise for a number of the Court's decisions where
constitutional protections were extended to corporations. See supra notes 77-80 and accompany-
ing text. For example, depriving corporations access to the federal courts provides a vehicle for
maintaining strength in corporate investments and promotes their growth. See HESSEN, IN DE-
FENSE OF THE CORPORATION 110-11 (1979). In a more general vein, Hessen explains that corpo-
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nation of the political process and the consequential decline in govern-
mental effectiveness and legitimacy. 88
The major reason asserted for providing full first amendment protec-
tion to corporate political speech is the need to sustain corporate input
into matters of public concern.1 89 As the American economy continues
to become centralized,' 90 an increasing number of economic, political
and social decisions are made in state and federal legislative forums
and by public elections and referenda.191 These decisions often have a
significant impact on the activities of large corporate enterprises. 192
Consistent with numerous court opinions, it is only equitable that per-
sons making decisions affecting corporate revenues should be exposed
to information supplied from persons with a corporate perspective.
Thus, a total ban on direct corporate political contributions and ex-
penditures seems unjust.193 However, opposing considerations dilute
the impact of this argument.
Corporate involvement in the electoral process frequently leads to
rate economic development is often sustained by numerous types of government action. These
include "subsidies, loan guarantees, protective tariffs, import quotas, and arbitrary licensing re-
quirements." Id. He notes that "[t]hese restrictions can be created and sustained only by political
power." Id. at 111. For one example of government support for corporate economic security, see
35 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 285-92 (1979), describing Congressional passage of a $3.5 billion aid
package to the Chrysler Corporation.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31, 145-49. Direct corporate access to the legisla-
tive political process now exists. Corporations are fee to "lobby" Congress in support or in oppo-
sition to any matter, within certain boundaries. 2 U.S.C. §§261-270 (1976). Commentators have
claimed that such access often results in legislative decisions based solely on corporate goals. See,
e.g., Emerson, The Petrodollar Connection, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1982, at 18 (successful
passage of A.W.A.C.s legislation resulted almost exclusively from corporate pressure on
Congress).
189. For example, see Brief of Appellants at 42, Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Arguing that
input by all corporations, not just media corporations, is essential to a democracy, the appellants
noted: "A voter in Massachusetts, concerned with such economic issues as the tax rate, employ-
ment opportunities, and the ability to attract new business into the state, might be just as inter-
ested in hearing. . . [the banking corporation's]. . . views on a proposed. . . [tax]. . .as say the
views of. . . the editorial staff of the Boston Globe." Id.
190. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; Samuelson, Merger Mania, NAT'L J., Nov. 28,
1981 at 2100, 2126.
191. See Clark, The Public and the Private Sectors- The Old Distinctions Grow Fuzzy, NAT'L
J., Jan. 19, 1980 at 80, 98. Clark describes three "waves" of regulatory legislative periods in Amer-
ican history. By far the third era, from 1950 to the present, contributed the most to the wealth of
current government regulations. Approximately twenty of the fifty-five current major regulatory
agencies were born in the last twelve years. As a result of these three periods, government regula-
tors increasingly make significant decisions impacting on business enterprises. Id. at 100. Regula-
tory-type decisions are also increasingly made in public referenda. See Shockley, supra note 120,
at 173.
192. See Clark, supra note 191, at 99-100.
193. See supra note 189; Comment, supra note 110, at 106. This is the premise of the
Meiklejohn theory as manifest in the commercial speech cases and in Bellotti. The public, to
make a rational, fair and intelligent decision, must be exposed to all relevant views. See supra
notes 34-37 & 103-107 and accompanying text. See Goss, First National Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti"
The Reopening of the Corporate Mouth - The Corporation's Right to Speak, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 841,
49-54 (1979).
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political corruption, a situation antithetical to a healthy government.194
Section 441b was enacted to guarantee the responsiveness of elected
officials to the public-at-large, and to protect the political system from
corporate domination. 195 As mentioned earlier, if unrestrained, corpo-
rations have a tendency to make significant campaign contributions en-
tailing quidpro quos. This is due in part to corporate access to large
financial resources and the significant impact of government regula-
tions on corporate operations.1 96 Preferential treatment by government
officials at the expense of individual natural citizens often results from
unrestrained corporate participation.1 97 The statute serves to curb this
corrupting corporate influence in American politics.'98
Equally necessary is the protection of the statute against perceived
corporate domination of the legislative process. Congress and the
courts have consistently recognized that the nation's strength stems
from the public's belief in the legitimacy of its government. 99 As the
Supreme Court has noted, disclosure of corporate domination of the
political process seriously undermines the public's perception of gov-
ernmental legitimacy.200 Prohibiting corporate contributions thus en-
hances public faith in public officials, promotes the integrity of the
electoral process, and sustains the interest of citizens in government.
Even legitimate corporate involvement tends to pollute the electoral
system. The Colorado studies, discussed above, demonstrate that
where corporate speech competes equally with the speech of natural
persons, the corporate views will likely prevail.20 1 This is but one ex-
ample where unrestrained corporate involvement suffocates opposing
views by effectively dominating the marketplace of political ideas.
20 2
Thus, where corporate and natural persons' right of speech conflict
there is a tendency for corporations to emerge the victor.20 3 The effect
194. See supra notes 24-31 & 150-162 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
197. Id.
198. When enforced the statute prohibits direct corporate influence of elections, and negates
this negative influence. See supra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 29 & 31 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 123-149 and accompanying text.
202. For additional evidence, see supra note 120. The Supreme Court was presented with
such evidence in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 441 (1982)(Marshall, J., concurring). See supra note 149. It is very possible that the Court would decide
Rent Control or other cases concerning corporate campaign prohibitions differently if similar evi-
dence was presented in an alternate fashion. See id. Justice Rehnquist appears to have voted
against upholding the ordinance because it imposed restrictions on corporations as well as natural
persons. 102 S. Ct. at 439 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see 435 U.S. at 822-29.
Thus, the court seems willing to countenance statutes' prohibiting solely corporate campaign
activities, if supported by a specific jurisdiction's evidence of corporate domination, or a similar
legislative finding. See 102 S. Ct. 439-41; supra note 149.
203. See supra notes 123-149 and accompanying text.
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of section 441b is to shield the public from this conflict and to promote
the diversity of views available in election campaigns. Further, it pro-
tects against actual and perceived corruption, and guarantees the pre-
mier position of natural persons in society.
Other policy concerns may be considered in evaluating section 441b.
The major argument supporting protected corporate political free
speech rights is the necessity of providing access to corporate views.2°4
However, this concern is met by the current law.205 Although section
441b prohibits direct corporate political speech,206 corporate employees
and shareholders are not barred from making contributions or expendi-
tures in any election.2"7 Thus corporate views may still reach the polit-
ical marketplace 0 8 and compete on a more equitable basis20 9 with
other natural persons.210 Additionally, the status quo negates any pos-
sibility of subsidizing and amplifying the political views of corporate
executives,21' and prevents the use of corporate funds contrary to the
wishes of shareholders.2 12 Instead shareholder influence in political
campaigns may be limited to private, personal contributions.2 13
These policies as well as contemporary legal literature reassert the
204. See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
205. 2 U.S.C. §441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
206. Id. §441b(a).
207. Id. These individuals are free to contribute and make expenditures within the limits set
by other campaign provisions. See 2 U.S.C. §441a (1976); 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
208. This is done by direct contributions from natural persons to political candidates repre-
senting "corporate" views, or by contributions from political action committees (PACs). See supra
note 22. Clearly corporate influence in political elections is facilitated by PACs, a device provided
for by current law. 2 U.S.C. §§441a, b(a)(4)-(7) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Individuals may be
limited to $1,000 in direct political contributions to a particular candidate over the course of a
primary, runoff and general election. 2 U.S.C. §441a (1976). However, PACs can contribute
$5,000 to a candidate per election, or make unlimited independent expenditures in non-presiden-
tial elections so long as they remain independent and uncoordinated with the candidate's cam-
paign staff. 2 U.S.C. §441a (1976 & Supp. IV, 1980). See Cohen, Congressional Democrates
Beware - Here Comes the Corporate Pacs, NAT'L J., Aug. 9, 1980 at 1304, 1306-08. PACs are
used not only by corporatiois but also by unions, trade associations and organizations. See id. at
1304-08.
209. Arguably, the higher contribution limitations from PACs seems to dilute the impact of
individuals' direct contributions. See Cohen, supra note 208.
210. Dissenting in Bellotti, Justice Rehnquist noted that the effect of the Massachusetts statute
should be put in its proper perspective: "All natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher
sovereign than the Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage in political activity." 435
U.S. at 828.
211. Cf. Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227, 231-33 (E.D. Pa. 1972), ajf'd 471 F.2d 811 (3d Cir.
1973), rev'd on rehearing 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (corporate execu-
tive's use of corporate funds to promote "non-partisan" political views). Section 441b prevents
corporate executives from using corporate assets to promote their own political views. See Cam-
marano v. U.S. 358 U.S. 498, 499-500, 512-13 (1959).
212. See Nicholson, supra note 8, at 999-1008; Goss, supra note 193, at 859-61; 435 U.S. at
792-93; supra note 167.
213. Of course they may attempt to gain greater influence by contributing to political action
committees. See supra notes 208-210. However corporate assets themselves are not permitted to
be contributed to political elections. 2 U.S.C. §441a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally Pat-
ton, supra note 8, at 502-08.
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theme of the superiority of natural persons' free speech rights.2 14 For
example, disagreement exists on the subject of the source of corporate
power, and the propriety of governmental control of it.21 5 Proponents
of strong control 216 argue that incorporation is a privilege providing the
recipient numerous benefits.21 7 Yet the tremendous powers that result
from these benefits demand strict government controls to insure the
protection of the public.218 Opponents argue that the general incorpo-
ration statutes of most states219 virtually guarantee corporate status to
any group or individual.220  Consequently, incorporation is seen as a
private event between individuals, with the proper state role being a
very limited one.22' Although these two views differ significantly in
their conceptions of corporate power, they do agree on one proposition:
the function of corporate entities is not to promote the corporationper
se, but to enhance economic development and the well-being of natural
persons in society.222
The supremacy of natural persons' well-being has been recognized,
as well, whenever the Court has granted constitutional protection to
corporate entities. Such rights have been extended when necessary to
promote corporate health for the ultimate benefit of natural persons,
the general citizenry.223 Although different theories have been ad-
vanced for supporting first amendment rights,224 they all stem from a
common conception that any speech, to be protected, must promote the,
stability of the political system for the benefit of natural persons.225
214. See generally Hessen, supra note 187; Nader, supra note 15.
215. This disagreement is manifest in the debate between Hessen and Nader on Nader's pro-
posal for federal chartering of certain corporations. Compare Hessen, supra note 187, at 105-15
(this plan would result in subordination of all individuals to the statute), with Nader, supra note
15, at 75-197 (federally chartering would provide an equitable use of corporate power).
216. Nader's proposal for federal chartering, as wellas some state incorporation statutes are a
manifestation of this view. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §2155 (imposes regulations on foreign
corporations if at least fifty percent of corporation's business is transacted within California).
217. This has been called the "concession theory" of incorporation. See Hessen, supra note
187, at 1-11; Nader, supra note 15, at 67-71; Ratner, supra note 8, at 19-21. See Cook v. J.1. Case
Plow Works Co., 85 Fla. 421, 96 So. 292 (1923).
218. Among others, these include the privilege of limited liability, perpetual existence, use of
the corporate name to sue and be sued, and potential tax advantages for shareholders. See HAM-
ILTON, CORPORATIONS 9-16 (1981); HENN, supra note 15, at 344-56.
219. A general incorporation statute requires the fulfillment of only a minimal number of
steps as a condition precedent to incorporation. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§607.161-167 (1981). See
HENN, supra note 15, at 20-22 (development of general incorporation statutes by state).
220. Reported cases are both rare and unusual where incorporation has been denied, after
following the required provisions of the incorporation statute. See State ex rel. Grant v. Brown,
39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974) (court upheld Secretary of State discretionary power to
withhold incorporation from homosexual organization).
221. See Hessen, supra note 187, at 9-33.
222. Compare Hessen, supra note 187, at 111-51 with Nader, supra note 15, at 252-55.
223. See supra note 76-80 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notse 34-39 ahd accompanying text.
225. Compare MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34 at 92-107 with supra note 38. At the
core of both theories is the view that the system of free speech is aimed at advancing society for
the benefit of natural individuals.
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CONCLUSION
Bellotti establishes the major focus for analyzing corporate political
free speech. According to the Court, any protections corporations may
receive flow directly from the right of the listening public to a wide
diversity of political views. This approach, however, created a major
problem-the ability of corporations to dominate political discussion.
As well-financed corporate speech enters the political marketplace, the
relative impact of natural persons' speech becomes de minimis. Resolu-
tion of this conflict, as well as the goal of sustaining a corruption-free
political environment, can only be achieved by determining the level of
constitutional protection to be afforded natural and corporate persons.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue. However,
corporate entities have been granted other constitutional rights only
when it would benefit the interests of natural persons. A similar ap-
proach should be employed regarding corporate political free speech
rights.
The ultimate issue is whether the political free speech rights of natu-
ral persons are superior to those of corporations. Upon balancing these
competing interests, it becomes evident that natural persons would best
benefit by the Court upholding the constitutionality of the statute. This
decision would reassert natural persons' superior position in the legal
system, and consequently strengthen the foundation of the political
process.
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